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The works of Polish philosophers, historians and classicists on the Euthyphro 
in the 19th century developed independently of any translations of the dialogue, even 
though two Polish translations of the dialogue were published (Platon 1858 and 1881) in 
the century1. The purpose of this paper is to provide evidence for a twofold interest that 
Polish readers had for Plato’s  Euthyphro in the second half of the 19th century. Firstly, 
Catholic thinkers brought up the ethical issues of the dialogue and supported the revival 
of the Scholasticism, confirming, at the same time, the vitality of Plato’s thought. Second-
ly, the text of Plato’s opusculum was a convenient didactic material for various teachers of 
*  This study was financed from the funds for scholarly research in the years 2008–2010 as a project 
no. NN 101 116435. I would like to thank Una Maclean–Hanćkowiak for proof–reading the English text.
1  The Euthyphro inspired also an eminent Polish translator of Plato’s dialogues, Władysław Witwicki, who 
is often referred to as the ‘Polish Schleiermacher’. As a gymnasium student, he was attracted to the problems 
touched upon in the dialogue, where he found important answers to his youthful ethical dilemmas that could 
not be solved satisfactorily by his catechism teacher ( Jeżewska 1957: 5).
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the Greek language: while the Euthyphro gave them the opportunity to raise ethical and 
logical issues, they also taught philosophy on the basis of this dialogue.
As already mentioned, the studies focusing on the Euthyphro, as well as these devoted 
to Plato in general, manifested two main tendencies. On the one hand, they stressed vari-
ous contemporary issues, especially the decline of religion and morals, and, on the other, 
they were historical and philosophical studies. These two tendencies frequently co-exist-
ed, e.g. in the studies published in the annual reports of classical gymnasiums. The follow-
ing overview, apart from its informative purpose, aims to examine the reasons which 
made the various thinkers, teachers, philosophers and historians read and comment on 
the Euthyphro.
One of the works that focused on the contemporary meaning of the Euthyphro was 
entitled “Euthyphro”, the First Platonic Dialogue, Analyzed and Estimated According 
to the New Intellectual Movement. The work was published in five parts and written by 
an author who hid themselves behind the pseudonym “C.”2 In this text, along with the 
passages devoted explicitly to the substance of the Euthyphro, the author made various 
remarks concerning the future of Poland and the Catholic Church, the decline of values, 
the critique of the socialist and individualistic movements etc. Furthermore, the author 
made several critical references to sophistry and German philosophy, especially Hegeli-
anism, which he considered to be a serious obstacle on the way to the Kingdom of God 
(Adamski 1883/1884: 4618).
Let us now pass on to the text itself. At the very beginning one can find a declaration 
of the necessity to revive philosophy in order to bring about the victory of the only true 
religion, i.e. Catholicism. The need of becoming reacquainted with Greek philosophy was 
justified by Adamski (1883/1884: 4577) in the following way: “since reason has to precede 
faith and philosophy has to pave the way for the revealed religion, and since we have to 
turn back to where we came from in our modern civilization, we also have to turn to the 
philosophy, that preceded the birth of the Gospel, which is Greek philosophy.” The value of 
Greek philosophy was twofold. Firstly, it provided the foundation for the structure 
of Catholic theology. Adamski did not need to convince the reader of the magnificence 
of the latter. Secondly, no faith can dispense with reason, and, consequently, it was Chris-
tianity together with philosophy that was to create the future of Christianity. However, 
Adamski had little respect for the philosophy of the 19th century, because of its absolutist 
trends, its pluralism and ethical relativism. The clash between the opposing philosophi-
cal schools and positions was regarded by Adamski as the weak point of contemporary 
philosophy.
Following the introduction, Adamski suggested a cure for this sad state of contempo-
rary thought, i.e. a return to the principles of reason and their roots in Greek philosophy. 
2  The most probable identity of the „C.” is Jan Adamski (1841–1918), who after joining the order of the 
Carmelites received the lay name: Celestinus. This would explain the initial. He was a Catholic writer, involved 
in various social and national matters. His philosophical education was generally scholastic and Thomistic, as he 
received it in the convents of the Jesuits in Galizia. His intellectual interests were, however, much broader than 
merely scholastic. His works were devoted to a. o. the philosophy of Polish messianism.
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He argued that this had been insufficiently acknowledged by his contemporaries who 
were unaware of its full picture and, thus, of the roots of European rationalism. “Modern 
philosophy can never turn its back on Aristotle and Plato, the two most outstanding lights 
shining from the remotest antiquity” (Adamski 1883/1884: 4585). Adamski ascribed to 
them the elaboration of the two opposing methods: deduction and induction. He consid-
ered Aristotle to have sufficiently applied both of them, whereas induction, he claimed, 
had Platonic origins. It was the method of induction that Adamski (1883/1884: 4585) 
recognized as the best one: “it can lead us into the invisible spiritual world, by investi-
gating its essence from its appearance; it can uncover the mysteries of the Divinity itself, 
leading to the recognition of Its essence from the created beings which are Its work.” 
Furthermore, Adamski (1883/1884: 4586) pointed out that the instinct, feeling, and intui-
tion of the truth are connected to the inductive method: “This gift of intuition is an inter-
nal λόγος, the most profound source of the panlogic, it is the word of God, sown from 
eternity […] as St. Augustine expresses it in his profound words, the internal Christ and 
our incessant teacher.” Through the logos, then, innate to human nature, the rational-
ity of human nature is identical to its Christian character. Thus, having acknowledged 
induction and intuition as sufficient methods for recognizing the highest truths, Adam-
ski (1883/1884: 4586) justified the title and subject of his work: “this is why in this study 
I refer to Plato, the incomparable master, who prepared the way for the Divine master, 
Jesus Christ.” Hence, his reason for choosing the Euthyphro was that it was an example 
of applying the inductive method. 
In the next passages, Adamski attempted to summarize the dialogue. Instead of using 
the Greek names of the gods (8 b), he quoted Jove and Saturn. While reconstructing the 
substance and the main issues of the dialogue, he added his critical remarks on polythe-
ism and pantheism. When Socrates proved that Euthypro’s definition of piety, as that 
which pleases the gods, is wrong, because there is no unity in this issue among the gods, 
Adamski (1883/1884: 4594) wrote: “Let us consider the alogic consequences of polythe-
ism and, thereby, of pantheism. If everything is divine, then the world is composed of 
opposite things. If we suppress the difference between them, then it will appear as full 
of contradictions. Thus, it is logic itself that leads us to one God. The same logic leads us 
also to the personal God.”
Having given the overview of the dialogue, Adamski draws his conclusions. First 
of all, Socrates is a philosopher that is aware of the fact that all knowledge needs to be 
founded on a rigid and eternal truth, for without it, as Adamski argues, the social order 
will be destroyed. The philosophical and theological knowledge which was founded on 
the eternal truth had been elaborated in the Middle Ages. It was impossible in the times 
before Christianity: “and this lets us understand why Leo XIII announced the return 
of the theological knowledge towards scholasticism, the only ark of Catholic reason, 
saved in the deluge of subjective notions, which has flooded the modern world” (Adam-
ski 1883/1884: 4605). Though, as Adamski remarked, neither Socrates nor Plato discov-
ered the existence of a personal God, they came to a recognition of ideas which cannot be 
anything but the perfect, original pattern of the created world. And this pattern is equal 
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to the essence and existence of God, being at the same time the criterion of truth. This is 
how, according to Adamski, Plato approximated the opening words of the Gospel of John.
Applying his conclusions to the trail of Socrates, Adamski wrote that Plato’s teacher 
merely opposed the belief of polytheism with “pure reason”. In monotheistic Christian 
thought, Adamski argued, the definition of piety, as that which pleases God, is main-
tainable. Being an opponent of any revolutionary movements, Adamski appreciated the 
attitude of Socrates, who was a total enemy of the official religion, but whose radicalism 
was limited to the theoretical sphere only. It was in pure theory that he was an adherent 
of monotheism. In practice, however, he did not intend to overthrow the religious status 
quo. He refrained from the latter, because it was “so fatal in its results, because it was 
unreasonable and provided evidence of intellectual immaturity” (Adamski 1883/1884: 
4606). Socrates recognized the power of religious institutions and he knew that even 
a false religion is better than atheism. A false religion may hold people in a vicious circle 
and hamper progress, but as a religion, it always exerts some beneficial influence that no 
atheism can offer. 
After further exposition of the Christian view of God, Adamski returned to the 
Euthyphro. Socratic induction was described as a method of discovering the world of 
ideas, which is, after all, a method “guiding the spirit through the visible shapes to the 
highest glittering lights of the invisible world and to the sun of the wisdom itself” (Adam-
ski 1883/1884: 4618). About Socrates and Plato Adamski (1883/1884: 4618) wrote: “With 
his method Socrates testified to the word from the eternity, residing in the human spirit, 
and being the source of all knowledge, all morals and human perfection. In this way, 
Plato, who illustrated and perfected the method of his master in his admirable dialogues, 
approached the Divine kingdom, which descended on the earth with the word which 
became flesh and dwelt among people to transform the human race into the temple of the 
God, and therefore this philosophy is a preface to the Gospel”.
At the end of his paper Adamski (1883/1884: 4618) expressed his view concerning the 
part that Plato’s legacy should play in modern times: “These dialogues of Plato show us 
how our social meetings, the common conversations and the feasts have to become for us 
the school of wisdom together with all the charm of life, free from scholastic discipline; 
how the conversations are to ennoble us, and how the feasts of the mortals are to be 
turned into the feasts of the gods, an example of which was given by Plato in his Sympo-
sium”. The last verses of Adamski’s paper expressed views closer to those of humanism 
than to scholasticism.
Adamski’s text on the Euthyphro is in some respects surprising. A Christian author 
choosing the Euthyphro for his subject would be expected to focus on its main point, i.e. 
the piety. In the work examined, however, the relation between faith and philosophy 
became the most important issue. What Adamski called the inductive method was a kind 
of philosophical investigation supported with intuition and that lead from the Creation to 
the Creator. This method was exemplified by the Socratic–Platonic philosophy. The right 
understanding of this method, however, was possible only owing to the Christian tradi-
tion. Both Plato and Christian thought practice the inductive method, which “consists 
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in the law of likeness and analogy, by which the real being is linked with the ideal one, 
whereas the created things are linked with the Creator” (Adamski 1883/1884: 4619). The 
Euthyphro was also to prove that philosophy does not have to be incomprehensible and 
exclusive, as Adamski viewed Hegelianism. He wrote: “I have shown how philosophy 
must become popular and accessible to everyone with a simplicity that philosophy has 
lost long time ago” (Adamski 1883/1884: 4619). Contrary to what Plato could have imag-
ined, the Euthyphro became a pretext for discussing the complicated relations between 
ancient culture and Christianity. The Euthyphro was shown to support the Neo-Scho-
lastic movement. 
Another Catholic thinker who devoted several pages to the Euthyphro in his extensive, 
though unfinished, History of Greek Philosophy from Thales to the Death of Aristotle, was 
Stefan Pawlicki3. It is significant that his discussion of the Euthyphro was placed in the 
chapter devoted to Socrates. One might conclude that Pawlicki considered this dialogue 
to be a credible source for reconstructing the character of Socrates as a philosopher. Such 
a conclusion is indeed right. For Pawlicki, the Euthyphro was the best example illustrat-
ing the essence of the Socratic method. He wrote about it: “It was known also as an irony 
(εἰρωνεία), as if it consisted exclusively in asking tricky questions to ridicule the oppo-
nent. The Sophists considered themselves to be wise men. By means of his questions, 
Socrates uncovered the emptiness of their wisdom. The situation became comic through 
the antithesis between the pretense of wisdom to the actual nonsense. At the same time, 
it was also tragic when moral perversity was shown to hide behind the alleged wisdom” 
(Pawlicki 1890: 363). In this respect the Euthyphro was very helpful for Pawlicki’s argu-
ment. He concluded his three page summary of the dialogue with the following state-
ment: “A splendid example of Socratic irony as well as of the art of discovering definitions” 
(Pawlicki 1890: 366, n. 1). At the same time he encouraged the reader to make himself 
acquainted with the whole of the dialogue. According to Pawlicki the Euthyphro was not 
a dialogue contributing anything substantial to our knowledge of Platonism. He made 
use of this dialogue as well as others, and occasionally of the works of Xenophon, to indi-
cate the essential components of the philosophy of Socrates, including the method of 
irony, the ‘purging of minds’ and ‘moral regeneration’. One important feature of Socrates’ 
philosophizing was however recognized as being absent from the Euthyphro: “the inven-
tive art or the art of midwifery (μαιευτική)” (Pawlicki 1890: 369).
Pawlicki regarded the early dialogues, including the Euthyphro, as historical sourc-
es providing us with knowledge of Socrates. His argument had it that: “In Xenophon’s 
Memorabilia Socrates is a good–natured and kind–hearted townsman who is guided by 
practical reason in moral questions, and who carefully avoids all other, especially reli-
gious and metaphysical issues. In Plato, he is a daring and profound thinker, who solves 
the most radical and convoluted metaphysical and theological problems with exceptional 
3  S. Pawlicki (1839–1915) was born in Gdańsk (Danzig) and gained Ph.D. in Wrocław (Breslau). His thesis 
concerned the philosophy of A. Schopenhauer. After being ordained and having lectured in Rome, he came to 
Kraków and till his last days lectured in theology and philosophy at the Jagiellonian University.
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absoluteness, often showing disregard for the tradition and beliefs of his own nation. In 
a word, Plato’s Socrates is as noble as Xenophon’s is ordinary and cheap” (Pawlicki 1890: 
375). Settling the dispute between the two images of Socrates, Pawlicki favored Plato’s 
Socrates as true to the historical Socrates. He refused to acknowledge any value of Xeno-
phon’s testimony: “Such a Socrates would never have been poisoned by the Athenians” 
(Pawlicki 1890: 375). It was quite obvious to him that Plato was the one who captured the 
authentic image of Socrates: “Plato is a great devotee of the truth; the characters of his 
dialogues are as real as portraits can be. A photographic exactness should not be expected 
of a portrait” (Pawlicki 1890: 375). Furthermore, Xenophon was not a philosopher, and 
in all probability he did not even think highly of philosophy. This was yet another reason 
to assume the priority of Plato’s testimony.
From Pawlicki’s Catholic point of view, an important question raised in the 
Euthyphro was the issue of the daimonion. Nevertheless, when discussing the issue 
Pawlicki did not quote the Euthyphro. Rather, he merely stated that some kind of inter-
nal voice must have appeared in Socrates’ soul since his early years and the voice would 
dissuade him from some activities. It was a prophetic voice: “The internal voice does not 
reveal to him any truth, it does not give him any supernatural light; it is just a brake, that 
does not allow him to do certain things. The philosopher considered it to be the voice of 
God, under whose particular guidance he believed he was, and a Christian sees nothing 
exceptional in it. After all, every soul, in different degrees and forms, receives similar 
inspirations from the above, so no proof against rationalism is required here. For a histo-
rian it is enough that Socrates was convinced of it and obeyed it in his life. The particu-
lar kind of such inspirations is irrelevant to philosophy, for it does not affect it in any 
respect” (Pawlicki 1890: 390). In other words, it was particularly important for Pawlicki 
that the voice of God, or the Revelation did not speak to Socrates. Socrates had certain 
intuitions, and there is nothing exceptional about them. They might even accord with 
the Gospel. Nevertheless, Socrates was certainly not given any divine inspiration that 
is characteristic of Christian writers exclusively. Socrates does not count among them. 
As Pawlicki (1890: 394) puts it: “Socrates is probably very far from Christ’s command-
ment: »Love your enemies, do good to those who hate you, bless those who curse you, 
pray for those who abuse you«, but the bridge is thrown, and over the bridge humankind 
will walk from the birch of envy to the olive branch of the brotherhood of the nations. 
The Athenian sage did not say: »love your enemies«, he only forbade it that any harm 
be done to them. Yet, this prohibition, even if expressed only in a negative form, was an 
enormous progress in comparison to the persecution that the distorted conscience of the 
then peoples demanded”.
Aside from the Catholic interpreters, an important part in the reception of the 
Euthyphro was also played by various gymnasium teachers. This can be clearly seen from 
the yearly gymnasium reports. Two such works will be presented here: the papers by 
Andrzej S. Jezierski (ca. 1860–1894) and Jan Tralka (1857–1916). The former taught in vari-
ous schools in Lwów, Nowy Sącz, Tarnów and Tarnopol, whereas the latter taught in 
Stryj. The works of classicists on ancient philosophy focused usually on one author or text. 
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Most of such studies were published in Polish (sometimes in Latin), and their purpose 
was to explain specific philological, literary and philosophical issues. Although their goal 
was first and foremost didactic, they were often reviewed in professional journals.
Tralka’s paper is quite typical of this genre. In its introduction, the reader could find 
some basic information concerning the history of Greece and the genesis of Sophistry 
that were to provoke Socrates to defy the Sophists’ relativism. After a short presentation 
of the general aims and subjects of other Socratic dialogues (Protagoras, Euthydemos, 
Laches, Gorgias), Tralka went on to count the Euthyphro among the transitory dialogues, 
arguing that Plato wrote them undoubtedly under Socratic influence, even though his 
original aim was already discernible, He characterized the aim as “the urge to lay the 
foundations of his philosophical dialectic; Plato could not have been satisfied with the 
negative aim of merely demonstrating the fallaciousness of the Sophists’ views; rather, 
he intended to replace the theories he had criticized with the new ones that were based 
on the rules of strict logical reasoning, producing, thus, his own system” (Tralka 1897: 4).
Plato was the first to have developed a philosophical method, for “he provided the 
rules stipulating the concept formation” (Tralka 1897: 4). Socrates consciously made use of 
them in the following way: “after launching into a dispute with somebody, he attempted to 
set the wrong concept right by way of inductive reasoning, and through this, to direct his 
interlocutor’s thought from false premises onto the right ones” (Tralka 1897: 4). Along with 
other Socratic dialogues, the Euthyphro was an excellent example of such an approach.
Jezierski, on the other hand, started his paper on the Euthyphro by presenting the 
dramatis personae and the general setting of the dialogue. According to Jezierski (1890: 
4), Euthyphro exemplifies “a good-hearted, irreproachable and righteous way of think-
ing” – and this must have been the only reason that made Socrates talk to him. “On the 
other hand, this was also a shallow mind that was totally incapable of any logical thinking 
or scientific investigation” (Jezierski 1890: 4). Usurping knowledge of divine matters, “he 
proves to be very conceited because of his alleged art” (Jezierski 1890: 5). This reflects 
a serious misunderstanding of the nature of the gods: “it is on the basis of folk beliefs that 
the shallow and erroneous mind of Euthyphro stands” (Jezierski 1890: 5). When inter-
preting the dialogue, Tralka (1897: 5) also severely criticized Socrates’ interlocutor: “It 
is a shallow, empty mind that is incapable of any philosophical reasoning; he is dull and 
unnatural in action”.
The glaring contrast between Socrates and Euthyphro was perfectly suited for differ-
ent didactic purposes. The former “has knowledge of real piety, is familiar with the rules 
of logical thinking, and possesses extraordinary intellectual resourcefulness, but he 
conceals his superiority over the effusive religious fanatic, who is incapable of any scien-
tific discussion” (Jezierski 1890: 7). Furthermore, Euthyphro’s fanaticism “following the 
line of the Sophists was calculated to gain admiration and blaze of sanctity for himself” 
(Jezierski 1890: 6). Students could thus easily see the difference between the superficial 
piety of Euthyphro and the deep piety of Socrates. “The conversation on piety conducted 
by the two characters shows Socrates as a representative of real piety that is based on 
a deep understanding of its essence and meaning which manifests itself in a truly virtuous 
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life. Euthyphro, on the other hand is a priest-Sophist that represents an apparent piety 
which is based on folk superstition only and is not confirmed by any internal godliness” 
(Jezierski 1890: 7). For didactic purposes, Jezierski presented the conversation between 
Socrates and Euthyphro in clauses, summarizing, thus, the most important passages of 
the dialogue: attempts at defining piety, their refutation, and Socrates’ criticism of the 
petitio principii error.
On the basis of its construction, Tralka counted the Euthyphro among the polemical 
dialogues leveled against the Sophists, noting, though, the absence of direct criticism 
of Sophistry. His argument had it that as the subject of the dialogue, i.e. the definition 
of piety, arose from Meletos’ accusation of Socrates, it would have been reasonable to 
make the accuser Socrates’ opponent in the dialogue. Tralka (1897: 13) explained that 
Plato did not do for the following reason: “Wanting to save the humorous tenor, full of 
irony and scorn, that are typical of Socrates in his conversations with Sophists, Plato 
selected Euthyphro as the conversation character, and not for instance Meletos, who was 
an ignoramus, incapable of comprehending anything. Thus, he made it easier to prove to 
Euthyphro, who boasted about his authority in divine matters, that his concept of reli-
gion was based on false assumptions”. In this respect, the dialogue could be regarded as 
a sui generis introduction to the Apology. An interesting feature of Tralka’s and Jezierski’s 
papers, this being dictated by the didactic purposes of their works, was the narration 
in Polish interspersed with Greek words and phrases. The authors did not explain any, 
assuming that the student would be familiar with them.
Let us turn to the texts themselves: “Euthyphro says that he could tell him more 
horrifying stories of that kind, should he want that. Socrates, however, postponing this 
for some other free moment (ἐπὶ σχολῆς), draws Euthyphro’s attention back to their 
current preoccupation, i.e. that he has not taught him what piety is, but merely stated 
that τοῦτο τυγχάνει ὃσιον ὂν, σὺ νῦν ποιεῖ, φόνου ἐπεξιὼν τῷ πατρί,. Thus, instead of 
a definition of piety, he gave just one example of τοῦ ὁσίου, whereas there are many other 
examples which elude such concept of piety” (Jezierski 1890: 4). In Tralka’s work, on the 
other hand, one may read the following: “Seeing Euthyphro’s confusion, Socrates releases 
him from any further argument by accepting Euthyphro’s premise: ὃ ἄν πάντες οἱ θεοὶ 
φιλῶσιν etc. However, he immediately says that the issue needs closer examination, for 
Euthyphro’s premise may have two alternatives, that a) τὸ ὃσιον is ὃσιον because φιλεῖται 
ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν, or b) φιλεῖται  because it is ὃσιον” (Tralka 1897: 9). Another passage: 
“Socrates, observing that his interlocutor is falling behind in thinking, assumes the role 
of a teacher. He explains to Euthyphro that when defining a given concept, one must first 
accept some genus proximum. Then, he gives such a premise and asks Euthyphro whether 
he thinks that τὸ ὃσιον must also be δίκαιον, i.e. moral and right. Next we [= readers] 
widen the content of the concept and reduce its scope with differentia specifica, with the 
feature which distinguishes the concept in question from the similar one” (Tralka 1897: 10).
Jezierski (1890: 24) recognized a twofold purpose in the dialogue: “In the first half 
of the conversation [there is a lot of] Socratic polemic against the indecent and perverse 
views about the gods and religion that Euthyphro, a fanatic priest representing the Athe-
199Some Remarks on the Nineteenth Century Studies of the Euthyphro in Poland
nian people, exhibits. At the same time, Socrates, having been just accused of heathen-
ism, also presents his defence. In the second half of the dialogue, there is an intention to 
dialectically define the concept of piety”. According to Jezierski, Plato in the Euthyphro 
stresses the rationalism of Socrates. This is not, however, such a rationalism that only 
leads to abstract ideas, but it is always closely connected to ethical issues: “consider-
ing various manifestations of external life goes never by without some benefit for pure 
philosophy; and, conversely, even in purely dialectical dialogues we also find hints at 
how to conduct our lives” (Jezierski 1890: 24). A similar point has been made by Tralka. 
Although Socrates is unable to produce any definition of piety with Euthyphro’s help, the 
reader may, nevertheless learn of the Socratic-Platonic concept of piety on the basis of 
the difference between the two interlocutors’ views. Socrates’s hints and guidance are 
very helpful in this matter. For these reasons the dialogue was regarded by Tralka as an 
instructive, and not merely polemical, dialogue. Furthermore, the reader can also learn 
to identify the logical errors concerning the definition and scope of concepts. Tralka 
(1897: 11) stated: “this work clarifies the dialectical method of Socrates, who demanded 
that when defining, the rule ὁρίζεσθαι καθόλον should be obeyed. Socrates corrects 
erroneous concepts and ideas, he rejects those that are ambiguous or unclear, and deletes 
the logical errors.” The scholar regarded the dialogue as the most mature in the first 
period of Plato’s literary production: “it is a transitional writing that leads to the second, 
i.e. dialectical phase of Plato’s writings” (Tralka 1897: 18). 
Neither Jezierski nor Tralka was content with the Euthyphro alone. The former made 
the dialogue a starting point for a discussion concerning the concept of piety in all other 
dialogues. The latter undertook a closer examination of the theory of ideas. The final 
parts of their works are the most original and bear testimony to their interest in philoso-
phy. Jezierski argued that the Euthyphro is the source of all later Platonic ethical concepts 
presented in other dialogues. According to the scholar, this confirmed its authenticity. 
As Plato’s last definition of piety, Jezierski (1890: 40) quoted the Laws, where: “Piety […] 
consists in the creature’s absolute devotion to the deity, as an instrument for carrying out 
the divine will which demands that man get rid of any unchaste lusts and by practicing 
virtue rise to the source of all the good”. Jezierski concluded his works with a discus-
sion on the Euthyphro’s authenticity. He did not decide whether the conversation, in the 
form as it is presented in the dialogue, actually took place. He also noticed the difficulties 
connected with determining the exact date of the dialogue, although he had no doubts 
about its early character, this being evidenced by its simplicity and the modesty of the 
scenery. On the other hand, Jezierski (1890: 43) emphasized that this might also have 
been an intentional device provoked by the subject of the dialogue, i.e. piety: “he clothed 
it in a modest robe, which suited it best because of its nature”. After Socrates’ death 
Plato left for Megara and “with his writings he attempted to open the Athenians’ eyes to 
the crime they had committed by sentencing an innocent man to death”(Jezierski 1890: 
46). Nevertheless, Jezierski did not want to rule out the hypothesis that the Euthyphro 
was written long after Socrates’ death. In favor of this hypothesis, Jezierski cited some 
philosophical arguments. In Xenophon’s and Plato’s early dialogues, justice and piety 
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were equal virtues, the relation of one man to another being the subject of the former 
and the relation of a man to the deity being the subject of the latter. In the Euthyphro (12 
e), however, Socrates asked the question that concerned justice as a part of piety. Adduc-
ing the arguments from the theory of ideas, Jezierski concluded that the Euthyphro was 
thought over and written as the last Socratic dialogue, i.e. as a transition to the dialectical 
period. Thus, he argued, it must have been written in Megara.
On the basis of various German works, Tralka attempted to present “the so-called 
Platonic ideology”. Its first stage was an inductive search for a definition of an ethical 
concept. Tralka, like Jezierski, was an adherent of the theory that Plato stayed in Mega-
ra after Socrates’s death. Plato broadened his philosophical interests there and went 
beyond the ethical issues. Then, contrary to the Sophists, he assumed that objective 
knowledge was possible, and, finally, in the last stage of his literary activity, Plato sought 
to create a philosophical system. To sum up, there are three stages of Plato’s evolution: 
1) the Socratic-ethical period with its increasing interest in logic, the Euthyphro belonging 
to this period; 2) the “ideological” period with the prevalence of metaphysical interests; 
3) the systematic period. Such a vision of Plato’s philosophical evolution was based on the 
chronology of the dialogues. While assuming that the Phaedrus was a mature dialogue, 
the scholar also considered the Sophist and Parmenides to belong to the second period, 
followed by the Phaedrus, Symposium, Phaedo, Philebus and Timaeus.
Finally, Wincenty Lutosławski (1863–1954) will also be mentioned here. In his classifi-
cation, the Euthyphro is one of the earliest dialogues. The stylistic affinity of the dialogue 
with the Laws was, according to Lutosławski’s method of stylometry, counted as 0.03 to 
1.0. By way of comparison, the dialogue was classified as the earliest. The Apology bore 
a smaller number, i.e. 0.02 (Lutosławski 1897: 163). The Euthyphro, Crito and Apology 
were written, according to Lutosławski, soon after Socrates’ death. And Plato’s stay in 
Megara did not result in the composition of any of the dialogues, let alone any of the 
dialectical dialogues. This was claimed  against the common opinion held by the scholars 
in the 19th century.
This most eminent Polish Plato scholar, whose investigations have been widely read 
and commented on, considered the period of direct Socratic influences to be the first 
stage of Plato’s philosophical development. The dialogues of this period are short and 
focus on ethical issues. The most important character is clearly Socrates, who dominates 
his interlocutors. In the ethical issues the emphasis is put on defining certain ethical 
concepts or refuting the Sophists. Lutosławski regarded the Euthyphro as very significant 
for Plato’s philosophical development.
Some distinctively Socratic features are found in the Euthyphro, these resulting from 
the Socratic influences and the absence of original Platonic considerations. One of those 
features is a frequent use of analogy and induction in order to formulate a definition of 
a given concept. Another important feature is emphasis on the insufficiency of a simple 
enumeration for definition. Socrates attempts to grasp a certain characteristic feature, 
a differentia specifica of the concept under examination, he calls it ἰδέα, without, however, 
any metaphysical sense. The other term, typical of Plato’s later metaphysical vocabulary 
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is παράδειγμα. Likewise, its meaning in the Euthyphro is limited to the common use 
(Lutosławski 1897: 188–200). There is, however, one substantially Platonic remark in the 
dialogue. Plato distinguished between a primary action and a secondary state result-
ing from the action: “any state of action or passion implies previous action or passion. 
It does not become because it is becoming, but it is in a state of becoming because it 
becomes (ὅτι γιγνεται γιγνόμενόν ἐστιν)” (10 c, translated by B. Jowett). Thus, according 
to Lutosławski, the Euthyphro, has to be counted among Plato’s early dialogues on both 
philosophical and philological grounds.
Most of the issues concerning the Euthyphro pertain also to other Socratic dialogues. 
The Apology was also one of the dialogues that was frequently read by various Chris-
tian thinkers. The questions of chronology was of secondary importance for them. The 
dialogue provided convenient and diverse material for the Greek language classes or 
preparatory courses in philosophy  or logic. The teachers’ works on the Euthyphro which 
were published in the gymnasiums’ annual reports are typical of this genre.  They were 
composed by experienced teachers and they intended to present the comprehensive 
interpretation of the examined text. Various scholars offered some attention to the issue 
of ordering the dialogues, but they were profoundly influenced by German scholarship. 
Examining the authenticity of Socrates’ picture in the Euthyphro was rare. Generally, it 
was accepted that the Platonic Socrates from the early dialogues was identical with the 
so-called historical Socrates.
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Some Remarks on the Nineteenth Century Studies of the Euthyphro 
in Poland
The present paper examined how Polish philosophers, historians 
and classicists understood and interpreted Plato’s Euthyphro in 
the 19th century. The article provides evidence for a twofold interest that 
Polish readers had for the dialogue in this period. Firstly, Catholic think-
ers focused on the ethical issues of the dialogue and supported the reviv-
al of the Scholasticism, confirming, at the same time, the vitality 
of Plato’s thought. Secondly, the text of Plato’s opusculum was a conveni-
ent didactic material for various teachers of the Greek language: while 
the Euthyphro gave them the opportunity to raise ethical and logical 
issues, they also taught philosophy on the basis of this dialogue.
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